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A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Henry Lowenstein* and Kathryn Kisska-Schulze**
INTRODUCTION
During the 2016 presidential campaign debate, Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton vowed to raise the Federal Estate Tax to sixty-five percent,1 while Republican
candidate Donald Trump pledged to repeal it as part of his overall tax reform
proposal.2 Following his election into the executive seat, President Trump signed into
law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on December 22, 2017, which encompasses
the most comprehensive tax law changes in the United States in decades.3 Although
the law does not completely repeal the Estate Tax, it temporarily doubles the estate
and gift tax exclusion amounts for estates of decedents dying and gifts made after
December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026.4
Following candidate Trump’s campaign pledge to repeal the Estate Tax,5 and
his subsequent signing of the TCJA into law during his first year of presidency,6 an
interesting question resonating from these initiatives is whether the Estate Tax is even
constitutional. Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of this tax in its 1921 decision New York Trust Company v. Eisner,7 it could be argued
that the Court did not adhere to the “strict constructionist” view of constitutional
interpretation when making its decision. Since that determination almost a century
ago, it has been widely accepted that the tax—which has generally targeted the
wealthy—is constitutional.8
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1 See Emily Stephenson, Clinton Proposes 65 Percent Tax on U.S. Billionaire Estates,
REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2016, 3:29 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-clinton
-tax-idUSKCN11S2GN [https://perma.cc/LG45-TMZJ].
2 See Rebecca Lake, How Trump’s Estate Tax Proposal Might Affect the Wealthy, SMART
ASSET (Jan. 23, 2017), https://smartasset.com/taxes/how-trumps-estate-tax-proposal-might
-affect-the-wealthy [https://perma.cc/86EK-R83C].
3 See Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 1, Tax Cuts and
Jobs Bill Act, and H.R. 1370 (Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state
ments/remarks-president-trump-signing-h-r-1-tax-cuts-jobs-bill-act-h-r-1370 [https://perma
.cc/2VQF-JY6D] [hereinafter Remarks by President Trump].
4 See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
5 See Lake, supra note 2.
6 See Remarks by President Trump, supra note 3.
7 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
8 Eisner itself was the last full challenge to the constitutionality of the Estate Tax. See
256 U.S. 345 (1921). See also discussion infra Part III.
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Despite the high political profile of the Estate Tax, scholarly literature is scarce
in analyzing this tax’s constitutionality.9 Further, the modern Federal Estate Tax,
issued during a 1916 populist era, has not seen a substantive Supreme Court
examination of the issue since the 1920s.10 Even within its early analyses, the Court’s
rulings skirted key constitutional issues of enumerated power.11
This Article takes a fresh look at the Federal Estate Tax, fitting during an era of
a Supreme Court consisting of a majority of adherents to a more “strict construction-
ist” point of view of constitutional interpretation. In a recent 6–2 Supreme Court
decision in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands,12 Justice Thomas opined, “[t]he
controlling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must
give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written . . . . We thus begin and end
our inquiry with the text, giving each word its ‘ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.’”13 The Roberts Court has not hesitated to reevaluate federal and state tax
overreach issues in line with the original intent of the reading of the Constitution,
most notably in its 2015 decision in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.
Wynne,14 where the Court struck down part of Maryland’s personal income tax as
violating the Constitution’s dormant commerce clause.15
Newly appointed Justice Neil Gorsuch, in his first opinion on the Supreme Court,
relied on the strict meanings of words,16 the printed text of statutes,17 and the proper
roles of Congress and the courts,18 to aid in his determination that the law passed by
9 Very few academic publications have specifically queried the actual constitutionality
of the Federal Estate Tax. See, e.g., Peter J. Kosydar III, Note, “Death and Taxes” or Death
Without Taxes?, 37 J. LEGIS. 224 (2012) (specifically analyzing the constitutionality of the
retroactive Estate Tax); Charles L.B. Lowndes, The Constitutionality of the Federal Estate
Tax, 20 VA. L. REV. 141 (1933) (analyzing the constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax);
James G. Wilson, The Unconstitutionality of Eliminating Estate and Gift Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 771 (2000) (arguing that the repeal of the Estate Tax may be constitutional legally,
but unconstitutional from a social sense).
10 See discussion infra Part III.
11 This is perhaps due to the Supreme Court choosing to follow the election returns rather
than an application of constitutional principles. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S
OPINIONS 26 (1901).
12 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
13 Id. at 1010 (citations omitted) (quoting Walters v. Metro. Ed. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S.
202 (1997)).
14 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
15 Id. at 1792. Justice Alito’s opinion on behalf of the majority was a recitation of the
Constitution’s history on taxation and how Maryland’s law violated the very historical prin-
ciples on which the framers placed limits on the taxing power. See The Supreme Court, 2014
Term—Leading Cases, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181, 183 (2015).
16 See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017) (opining
on grammar etiquette and the correct use of the past participle tense).
17 See id. (applying noscitur a sociis to determine the meaning of the word “owed” within
the applicable statute).
18 See id. at 1724–25 (“And while it is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Congress
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Congress to guard against abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection methods does
not apply to people trying to collect debts owed to themselves.19 Delivering the Court’s
unanimous decision, Justice Gorsuch noted, “it is never our job to rewrite a constitu-
tionally valid statutory text.”20 With the recent addition of Justice Gorsuch to the
bench—who ascribes to an “ardent textualist” interpretation of the Constitution21—the
constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax may eventually be ripe for a new review.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the constitutionality of the Federal Estate
Tax from a classical approach. To meet this objective, we: (i) provide a historical
analysis of the origins and intent of our nation’s federal taxing power, (II) explore
the establishment and evolution of the modern Federal Estate Tax, (III) analyze the
judicial constitutional challenges to the Estate Tax, (IV) theorize that the Federal
Estate Tax lacks a constitutional foundation legitimizing its inclusion in the Federal
tax code, and (V) conclude that the Federal Estate Tax infringes on the United States
Constitution from a “strict constructionist” viewpoint.
I. A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL TAXING POWER
The federal tax system of the United States government is often referenced as
a “voluntary” system.22 The concept of voluntarism dates back to the founding of the
Republic and the ultimate tax structure established by the Framers in the Consti-
tution.23 Students of American history will recall that key underpinnings of the
American Revolution (1775–1781)24 were based primarily upon protests of “taxation
without representation.”25 The Thirteen American Colonies of Great Britain, loyal
has written, it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory text under the banner
of speculation about what Congress might have done had it faced a question that, on every-
one’s account, it never faced.”).
19 See id. at 1721 (explaining the findings of the district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit which the Court ultimately affirmed).
20 Id. at 1725.
21 Eric Citron, Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017,
12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neil-gorsuch/ [https://
perma.cc/32SH-T834].
22 See, e.g., Leslie Book, Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 85, 113 (2009) (identifying “the contestation that arises from a voluntary federal
tax system”); Joseph M. Landolfi, Jr., Note, The Internal Revenue Service Under Equitable
Attack, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 443, 456 (1997) (noting that the United States’ federal tax
system has been “classified as a voluntary system”). See also Mark Berggren, Note, I.R.C.
§ 6103: Let’s Get to the “Source” of the Problem, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 832 (1999)
(equating the Federal tax system with a voluntary system).
23 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text.
24 The American Revolution ended with the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 and
formally by the Treaty of Paris in 1783.
25 See Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without Representation”
versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (noting that “no taxation
without representation” was the “mother’s milk” of American history education).
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to Imperial Britain under King George III and Parliament, became subject to a series
of oppressive taxes allegedly imposed to pay for Britain’s expenses in the French
and Indian War.26 The seeds of discontent on oppressive taxation, however, began
long before.
A. Early Colonial Taxation
Twenty years prior to the American Revolution, colonial citizens under Great
Britain were increasingly limited by its mercantile laws on purchasing goods exclusively
from British sources.27 Beginning with the Navigation Acts of 1650, 1651, and 1660,
the Royal British government mandated the nature and type of purchases made by
American colonists to those of British origin on British ships, depriving Americans of
less expensive competitive trade.28 This also assured Britain’s unrestricted ability to
tax transactions for its own revenue. Taxes imposed without any representation of those
taxed in the colonies included, among others: wool, hats, molasses, iron, and sugar.29
The most notorious tax was the Stamp Act of 1765,30 which led to a major uproar
in the colonies.31 Colonial citizenry pressure led to the establishment of the Stamp
Act Congress, forerunner of the later Continental Congress.32 The British government
26 The French and Indian War was the North American extension of Europe’s Seven
Years’ War. Britain sought to stop French expansion into the Northwest and Western parts
of North America including French Canada. The British ultimately won the war, with France
conceding its claims in the Treaty of Paris (1763). Though the British claimed expenses to
the American Colonies, in reality, the militias of the thirteen Colonies under Royal Com-
manders incurred major expenses in funds and lives defending American territory. Indeed,
most of the lead generals of the American Revolution, including George Washington, were
veteran officers of the French and Indian War. See French and Indian War/Seven Years’
War, 1754–1763, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cp/90614.htm
[https://perma.cc/MW87-4NLT] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
27 See infra notes 28–35 and accompanying text.
28 See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1753 (1996) (noting that the various Navigation Acts were damaging
to the early colonial economies due to restrictions on free trade).
29 Henry J. Sage, The British Imperial Economic System: Mercantilism—or “State Capi-
talism,” SAGE AM. HIST., http://sageamericanhistory.net/colonies_empire/topics/mercantilism
.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K28S-UMKK]. George Washington himself
complained bitterly about these conditions. Author Chernow quotes: “For instance, the finest
salt for curing fish came from Lisbon, but England’s mercantilist policies forced [Washington]
to import inferior salt from Liverpool. He constantly felt snarled in a tangled web of perverse
economic regulations drawn up by London bureaucrats.” RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A
LIFE 142 (2010).
30 See George Elliott Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution: 1763–1775, in 8 THE
AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY 137 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1905).
31 See id. at 142 (“But appearances were deceptive: there was a smouldering fire of popu-
lar resentment which might at any time be stirred into a living flame.”).
32 See Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History
of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 388 (2009).
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quickly repealed the tax in 1766.33 Further attempts to tax the colonies and place re-
strictions viewed as unfair and oppressive returned shortly after in the Townshend
Acts (Revenue Act of 1767).34 Though partially repealed in 1770 following deaths in
the Boston Massacre, it later led to the infamous 1773 Tea Act.35 Explosive Bostonian
reaction resulted in the Boston Tea Party.36
The economic die had been cast against taxation wrapped in the patina of
independence and liberty by Samuel Adams and his “Sons of Liberty”,37 as well as
other vocal figures in the colonies, including Patrick Henry of Virginia.38 Colonists
formed the First Continental Congress to induce Parliament and King George III to
adopt a less oppressive tax system,39 which was hugely unsuccessful.40 In April 1775,
the first shots of the American Revolution were fired at Lexington and Concord,
Massachusetts.41 In England, Lord North passed the Prohibitory Acts which declared
that failure to pay taxes or to boycott the same was treason under British law.42
On July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress issued its Declaration of
Independence.43 Eight days later it drafted the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union (the nascent United States’ first constitution).44 Sensitive to the issue of taxation,
Article VIII spelled out specifically the enumerated powers of Federal taxation:
All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred
for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the
33 Id. at 391.
34 REVENUE ACT OF 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46. See also Richard A. Westin, Americans’
Unwillingness to Pay Taxes Before the American Revolution: An Uncomfortable Legacy, 13
J. JURIS. 11, 16–18 (2012).
35 TEA ACT OF 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 44; see also Westin, supra note 34, at 18–19, 21.
36 See KEVIN PHILLIPS, 1775: A GOOD YEAR FOR REVOLUTION 95 (2012).
37 See Boston Tea Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Boston-Tea-Party [https://perma.cc/SU5U-2T6P] (noting
that monopolistic practices led colonists to join Samuel Adams and his Sons of Liberty).
38 In a speech made to the Second Virginia Convention in 1775, Patrick Henry, rallying for
independence, spoke the now famous phrase, “[G]ive me liberty, or give me death!” Paul E.
Fitzmorris, The Right to Dissent—An American Heritage, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J. 467, 468 (1969).
39 See PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 96.
40 The British instead enacted the Restraining Acts in 1775. The New England Trade and
Fisheries Act, 15 Geo. 3, c. 10 (Eng.); Trade Act 1775, 15 Geo. 3, c. 18 (Eng.).
41 See PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 10; Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the
Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1243
(opining that the Restraining Act of 1775, in conjunction with the Navigation Act of 1761,
the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Intolerable Acts of 1774 helped spawn the Revolution).
42 See PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 266.
43 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776). See generally Carlton F.W. Larson, The
Declaration of Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701
(2001) (providing an in-depth, historical perspective of the Declaration of Independence).
44 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 545–46 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). Final ratification was not completed by all the states until 1781.
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united states in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a
common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states
in proportion to the value of all land within each state, granted
or surveyed for any Person, as such land and the buildings and
improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode
as the united states in congress assembled, shall from time to time
direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be
laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures
of the several states within the time agreed upon by the united
states in congress assembled.45
Effectively, federal taxing power would be subject to the consent of the states,
not a centralized federal government.46 Congress had no taxing power, resulting in
its inability to pay the debts of the new nation in financing the war against Britain.47
Failures of the Articles of Confederation led to the establishment of the current United
States Constitution,48 which guaranteed strict enumerated powers to Congress,49
leaving any powers not enumerated by Congress to the states,50 and those not
enumerated to the states to the people.51
Faced with debts and fiscal requirements, the Framers faced the challenge of
structuring a tax system that would prevent the social and economic upheaval that
precipitated the American Revolution. The Framers were well versed in a history of
taxation going back to the Romans and even Biblical times;52 a seemingly infinite
array of innovative and often unfair, oppressive devices invented by sovereigns, as
Thomas Jefferson elucidated in the Declaration of Independence against King George
III, “[f]or imposing Taxes on us without our Consent . . . He has erected a multitude
of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out
their substance.”53
45 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 217 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1912). Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Articles of Confederation added a further restriction on states in-
terfering with commerce by foreign treaty: “[n]o state shall lay any imposts or duties, which
may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the united states in congress
assembled, with any king, prince or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by
congress, to the courts of France and Spain.” Id. at 216.
46 See id. at 217.
47 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224 (2004) (describing the money prob-
lems that pervaded under the Articles of Confederation).
48 See id. at 243–69.
49 U.S. CONST. art. I.
50 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
51 Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
52 See Saul K. Padover, The World of the Founding Fathers, 25 SOC. RES. 191, 196–99
(1958).
53 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 12, 19 (U.S. 1776).
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The Framers’ discussion of the role of taxation by the federal government has
generally been reflected in the Federalist Papers, particularly Federalist Nos. 30–36,
presumed authored by Alexander Hamilton.54 Hamilton argued for a strong federal
taxing system of both internal and external taxes, particularly to cover war and natural
disasters.55 He theorized that the peoples’ representatives in Congress would prevent
usurpation of state taxing powers and abuses by the central federal government.56
Anti-Federalists regarded Hamilton’s views as creating a strong central government
akin to a monarchy, ultimately tyrannical; a situation the revolution did not wish to
duplicate.57
The Framers ultimately drafted a Constitution encompassing compromise, furnish-
ing proscriptive language to establish Article I’s first enumerated power of Congress:
“[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.”58 Congress’s taxing power reflected the apprehensions of the Framers that
the federal government’s taxing power be strictly limited to two specific categories—
(1) Import-Export Taxes referenced as “Duties and Imposts,” and, (2) Consumption
Taxes known as “Excise” taxes.59 (The specificity of these taxing categories and deci-
sion to not include property taxes, income taxes or taxes on estates, had to be conscious
intent by the Framers as these forms of taxation were in force in one form or another
under British Rule, while others were traditionally thought to be inherent state powers.)
The Constitutional taxing powers were further set to ensure that federal taxes would
be fair across all states, prescribing specific tax law uniformity principals.60
First, the federal tax system effectively established “economic intercourse,” or
volunteerism.61 Internal excise taxes were imposed on the likes of stamps and spirits,
54 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30–36 (Alexander Hamilton); CHERNOW, supra note 47, at
255–56.
55 See CHERNOW, supra note 47, at 256 (“Not only would taxes underwrite operating ex-
penses, but they would enable the country to pay off its debts, restore its credit, and raise large
loans in wartime.”).
56 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 28, 31 (Alexander Hamilton); CHERNOW, supra note 47, at 256.
57 John C. Pinheiro, Assessing the Anti-Federalists, 20 RELIGION & LIBERTY 4, 4–5
(2010), https://acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-20-number-2/assessing-anti-federalists
[https://perma.cc/F3XM-SKTW]. Anti-federalists included Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts),
Patrick Henry (Virginia), and George Clinton (New York). Id. at 4.
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
59 See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
61 See Sam Kalen, Dormant Commerce Clause’s Aging Burden, 49 VAL. U.L. REV. 723,
n.71 (2015) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 47–49 (1993)
(discussing how Marshall broadened the Commerce Clause to include all economic inter-
course)).
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which the colonists protested against vehemently.62 A person who did not purchase
whiskey, for example, was not subject to the Whiskey Tax. Modern day foreign gov-
ernments have embraced this similar concept of “consumption taxes”63 by way of
their implementation of value-added tax systems (VAT).64
The second established tax principle was an external tax, likewise based on
volunteerism, and included “imposts” or “duties” on imported goods.65 Tariffs had
been a well-established and minimally controversial form of taxation worldwide and
American colonists were used to them.66 Consumers rarely felt the effect of these
taxes as they were passed through in the price of goods sold; although they tended
to disproportionally affect southern states who utilized higher imports of goods.67
The third principle formed by the Framers was federal tax uniformity.68 The
concept of tax uniformity was to comport with the Constitution’s Full Faith and
Credit Clause, assuring that states be treated equally.69 In fact, two other provisions
were included in the base of the Constitution itself, one being “apportionment”—that
is, taxes had to be laid in proportion to state populations70—and the other to prohibit
one state from taxing the product of another state.71
This tax structure ran the fiscal business of the government until the 1913 enact-
ment of the Sixteenth Amendment, which established the income tax.72 Nevertheless,
public antipathy to federal taxes, even those authorized under Article I, remained an
62 See Arcila, supra note 32, at 387–88 (addressing that in the eyes of the early colonists,
Parliament’s “external” tax regulation funded “regulatory apparatus,” but Parliament’s taxing
power was illegitimate with respect to “internal” taxes, which included an excise tax resonating
from the Stamp Act).
63 Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place In The
Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 206, 225–26 (1987).
64 Id. Schenk explains that the VAT is a tax imposed on the “value added” to goods as
they move through production and distribution, and to services as they are rendered. This tax
is generally passed on to the customers via increased prices of goods and services. See id.
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (stating that the taxing power is subject to the require-
ment that all duties, imposts, and excises “be uniform throughout the United States”).
66 See Arcila, supra note 32, at 382–88 (describing the shift from colonial acceptance of
British regulatory measures to disdain).
67 See Wiecek, supra note 28, at 1752–53 (noting that the southern colonies relied on to-
bacco exports to generate wealth and British regulatory acts, such as the various Navigation
Acts, damaged the southern economy by restricting exports and raising the price of imports).
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (detailing all taxes must be “uniform throughout the United
States”).
69 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
71 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State.”).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The one exception to the tax structure preceding the Six-
teenth Amendment was Lincoln’s imposition of an income tax during the Civil War, which
was later declared unconstitutional. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
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intense public matter.73 James Madison, considered the “Father of the Constitution,”74
faced continual backlash on federal taxes and tax collections while serving as the
nation’s fourth president.75 In 1813, nearly a quarter century after the ratification of
the Constitution and its taxing power to Congress, Madison proposed an increase in
excises and imposts to pay for the War of 1812 and preserve the nation’s credit
honor.76 Madison’s own party leaders objected, stating, “to look upon a tax gatherer
as a thief, if not to shoot him as a burglar.”77 Five years later, Chief Justice John
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,78 invoked the premise that the power to tax is
the power to destroy.79
B. American Civil War Taxation
Notwithstanding the strong stare decisis directing Congress toward only those
specific federal taxes allowed by the Article I enumerated power, an exception
occurred during the era of the American Civil War.80 To raise funds, President
Lincoln signed the Revenue Act of 1861, imposing a three percent income tax on
incomes over $800.81 Perhaps because of the intensity of citizen loyalty to the Union
and dedication to winning the war, the income tax did not incur an immediate
constitutional challenge.82 That challenge, however, arose a decade after its repeal
in the 1880 Supreme Court case Springer v. United States,83 whereby the constitution-
ality of the income tax (then since amended) was pitted against a state Estate Tax.84
William Springer argued the Civil War era income tax was an impermissible
direct tax on his estate by the federal government, not apportioned among the states
73 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
74 James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 837, 839 (2004). Liebman & Garrett’s article provides an in-depth discussion of
Madison’s role in the framing of early constitutional aspirations.
75 See Nelson Dingley, Jr., The Sources of National Revenue, 168 N. AM. REV. 297,
298–99 (1899).
76 See id. at 300–01.
77 CHARLES J. INGERSOLL, 1 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE SECOND WAR BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 120 (1845).
78 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
79 Id. at 327 (“An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy; be-
cause there is a limit beyond which no institution and no property can bear taxation.”).
80 The American Civil War lasted from 1861 to 1865. Warren W. Hasslet & Jennifer L.
Webber, American Civil War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/event/American-Civil-War [https://perma.cc/6WQL-GKZS] (last updated May 2, 2018).
81 Act of Aug. 5, 1861 ch. 45, § 49 12 Stat. 292, 309 (1861) (repealed in 1871).
82 Lincoln was not one during the war to dwell on the limitations imposed by the Consti-
tution. He notoriously suspended the constitutional right of habeas corpus, notwithstanding
admonitions from the Supreme Court. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 303–04 (1995)
(citing Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (1861)).
83 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
84 Id.
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in violation of the Constitution’s Article I taxing power.85 The Court avoided
addressing whether the income tax was an unauthorized Article I taxing power of
Congress and hence unconstitutional, instead holding:
The tax here . . . is not a tax on the “whole personal estate” of the
individual, but only on his income, gains, and profits during a
year, which may have been but a small part of his personal estate,
and in most cases would have been so. This classification lends
no support to the argument of the plaintiff in error.86
The Springer court further concluded that “direct taxes, within the meaning of
the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes
on real estate, and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the
category of an excise or duty.”87 The implication, though not explicitly stated in
Springer, was that a tax on personal assets (estates) by the federal government would
not be constitutional.88 Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court ruled the income tax
an unconstitutional direct tax in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.89
C. Populism and the Federal Estate Tax of 1916
Post–Civil War, the United States entered an era of economic growth known as
the “Gilded Age,” where it witnessed a rapid and manifest rise of industrialism and
national income.90 As industrialists used their economic power to the detriment of
farmers, small businesses, and consumers, widespread public bitterness ensued,
leading to the establishment of antitrust laws in the Sherman Act.91
Simultaneously, the rise of the Farmers’ Alliance—a socio-political organization
successor to the Granger Movement92—became the stimulus for what was later known
85 Id. at 588.
86 Id. at 598.
87 Id. at 602.
88 See id.
89 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (“We are of the opinion that the law in question, so far as it levies
a tax on the rents or income of real estate, is in violation of the Constitution; and is invalid.”).
This decision was negated by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI.
90 The author Mark Twain first coined the term “Gilded Age.” MARK TWAIN & CHARLES
DUDLEY WARMER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY (1874). The term references the
post–Civil War period of rapid growth in the United States from approximately 1870–1900.
See also T. ADAMS UPCHURCH, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE GILDED AGE (2009).
91 DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY PULPIT 192 (2013). See also Sherman Antitrust
Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1890).
92 See Granger Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 21, 2014), https://www.bri
tannica.com/event/Granger-Movement [https://perma.cc/A8X3-5SPM] (“The Granger move-
ment [encompassed a] coalition of U.S. farmers, particularly in the Middle West, that fought
monopolistic grain transport practices during the decade following the American Civil War.”).
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as the Populist Party wing of the Democratic Party,93 pressing against Wall Street,94
large businesses’ concentration of wealth,95 and even demanding nationalization of
all United States railroads.96 President Theodore Roosevelt dismissed the members
of this early movement as “pinheaded, anarchistic, crank[s],”97 even as he too railed
against the dangers of concentrated economic power, particularly by John D.
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust.98
Among the largest, wealthy industrialists portrayed in the press as “Robber
Barons,”99 there had operated an unwritten “social contract.”100 While these capitalists
accumulated great wealth, they also made great unwritten quid pro quo contributions
to their communities and society in general.101 Such capitalist tradition was shattered
93 See Populist Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bri
tannica.com/event/Populist-Movement [https://perma.cc/4W6P-BWXH].
94 One Populist Leader declared, “Wall Street owns the country. It is no longer a government
of the people, by the people and for the people but . . . of Wall Street, by Wall Street and for
Wall Street.” Walter Adams, The Sherman Act and its Enforcement, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 319,
320 (1953).
95 See Populist Movement, supra note 93.
96 See Army Appropriations Act of 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 645 (1916) (authorizing
the President to take control of transportation systems during wartime); see also Proclama-
tion No. 1419 (1917).
97 GOODWIN, supra note 91, at 193.
98 See Daniel A. Crane, Essay, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in
1912, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2015) (noting that Theodore Roosevelt was widely
characterized as a “trustbuster” for his role as president against the likes of Rockefeller and
other “Robber Barons”).
99 See Robert McNamara, Learn the Meaning and History of the Term Robber Baron,
THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/robber-baron-definition-1773342 [https://perma
.cc/TN36-JCFD] (last updated May 1. 2018) (“‘Robber Baron’ was a term applied to a
businessman in the 19th century who engaged in unethical and monopolistic practices,
utilized corrupt political influence . . . and amassed enormous wealth. The term itself . . .
dated back centuries . . . [and] was originally applied to noblemen in the Middle Ages who
functioned as feudal warlords and were literally ‘robber barons.’”).
100 Ron Chernow, Philanthropy the Smart Way, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1999), https://ny
ti.ms/2O5zq6u.
101 See PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE (2002) (describing how Andrew Carnegie, who personally
advocated against inherited wealth, built public libraries throughout communities and small
towns and established a non-profit foundation for teachers’ pensions); see also Jon W. Bruce
& D. Don Welch, Vanderbilt Law School in the Nineteenth Century: Its Creation and
Formative Years, 56 VAND. L. REV. 497, 508 (2003) (noting that Vanderbilt University’s
name references the institution’s recognition of the financial contributions of Cornelius
Vanderbilt); Daniel A. Crane, Did We Avoid Historical Failures of Antitrust Enforcement
During the 2008–2009 Financial Crisis?, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 219 (2010) (offering that
the Robber Barons, which included J.P. Morgan, rose to fix the problem during the panic of
1893); Thomas Cothran, Note, The Sophistic Method?: Dialectic and Eristic in Legal Peda-
gogy, 100 KY. L.J. 177, 180 (2012) (examining the history of the Carnegie Foundation);
History of the Morgan, MORGAN LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.themorgan.org/about/history
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by the unsavory business conduct of Standard Oil’s John D. Rockefeller.102 Becoming
one of the richest men in America, Rockefeller was notorious for giving relatively
little back to civic or community charitable organizations or causes, raising the ire
of both political parties at the concentration of personal wealth widely viewed as
accumulated by unethical, distasteful means.103
Rockefeller was not unaware of the growing political tides against the wealthy
and the risks to his and other similarly situated families’ estates posed by taxation’s
“public redistribution” of his accumulated wealth.104 Creating non-profit foundations
exempt from state estate taxation became a key strategy.105 Andrew Carnegie
chartered his foundation in 1911 and Rockefeller followed suit in 1913, funding the
Rockefeller Foundation with $100 million.106 These efforts protected a large part of
the industrialists’ estates from any estate taxation.107
In the 59th Congress (1907), during President Roosevelt’s final term, Democratic
members of Congress failed to pass legislation for an income tax and a national
inheritance tax.108 The income and inheritance taxes became the platform and cam-
paign banner of the Democratic Party under William Jennings Bryant in the 1908
Presidential election.109 Bryant lost to Republican William Howard Taft.110 Post-
election, federal tax policy remained constitutional “excises, duties, and imposts.”111
In 1909, President Taft proposed a two-percent excise tax on corporations in an
attempt to bypass the Pollock ruling that a federal income tax was unconstitutional.112
-of-the-morgan [https://perma.cc/2CD5-TXTR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (addressing J.P.
Morgan’s influence on the Pierpont Morgan); Charles Molesworth, How a Capitalist and a
Critic Shaped Metropolitan Museum of Art, N.Y. POST (Mar. 6, 2016), http://nypost.com
/2016/03/06/how-a-capitalist-and-a-critic-shaped-metropolitan-museum-of-art/ [https://perma
.cc/PX2J-5PDT] (articulating Morgan’s contributions to the Met).
102 See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 563 (2004).
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 See Matthew F. Jones, The Other Family Tree: Leaving Your Legacy in a Private
Foundation, 62 ALB. L. REV. 567, 582 (1990) (explaining the tax benefits of placing assets
in a foundation).
106 CHERNOW, supra note 102, at 566. See also Tanya Marsh, A Dubious Distinction:
Rethinking Tax Treatment of Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV.
137, 143–44 (2002) (discussing the importance of both Rockefeller and Carnegie in setting
the precedent for professional philanthropy).
107 CHERNOW, supra note 102, at 566.
108 GOODWIN, supra note 91, at 516–17.
109 Id. at 548.
110 William Jennings Bryan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www
.britannica.com/biography/William-Jennings-Bryan [https://perma.cc/B4QE-MHV8].
111 William Howard Taft, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/william
-howard-taft [https://perma.cc/H6V5-UDV9].
112 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate In-
come Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 98–100 (1990) (discussing the inception of the Corporate Excise Tax).
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Congress, pressured by populist fever in both parties,113 passed the Sixteenth Amend-
ment granting Congress additional enumerated power to impose an income tax and
to abolish the Article I restriction on apportionment of taxes based on population.114
The income tax was viewed as social justice—a public catharsis by Progressives
opposed to wealthy businessmen and by Conservatives as a way to end the age-old
conflicts over tariffs—thus garnering unique bipartisan support in Congress.115
Though there had been simultaneous clamoring for a federal inheritance [Estate]
tax,116 that power was not included in the Sixteenth Amendment.117 Constitutional
principles remained in place; Congress, absent a war emergency, lacked the enu-
merated power to issue a Federal Estate Tax.118
Notwithstanding Republican administration victories in major antitrust cases,119
Progressive demands to take back or reduce the concentrated wealth of the Robber
Barons directly continued. In 1912, Republican control of the Executive and Legis-
lative branches changed with the election of Democrat President Woodrow Wilson.120
Three years later, under the Wilson Administration, Congress by statute—but absent
direct enumerated constitutional power to do so—enacted what we now know as the
modern Federal Estate Tax.121
D. The Birth of the Modern Federal Estate Tax
The first attempt to establish an Estate Tax at the federal level was the Stamp
Tax of 1797.122 Reminiscent of the British Stamp Act leading to the Revolutionary
War, this was a tax on the paperwork in processing wills in probate and estate
administration for the purpose of funding the United States Navy.123 These were flat
fees,124 similar to stamp fees imposed by local governments in transacting real estate
deeds. The tax was bitterly unpopular and repealed in 1802.125
113 See id. at 93.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
115 See Kornhauser, supra note 112, at 98–99.
116 See id. at 93, 95–96.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
118 See id. (giving Congress only the power to issue a federal income tax, not an estate tax).
119 See, e.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
120 United States Presidential Election of 1912, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 4,
2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1912 [https://
perma.cc/9485-P68E].
121 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (repealed 1918).
122 Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in
Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 844 (2006).
123 Id.
124 See id. (“The rate was relatively modest, ranging from $0.25 on a legacy of $50 to
$100 (a rate of 0.25% to 0.5%) to $1 per $500 of a larger legacy (a rate of 0.2%).”).
125 Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME
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The American Civil War and its emergency revenue needs led Congress, at the
urging of President Abraham Lincoln, to enact taxes which in later years were found
unconstitutional or extra-constitutional.126 Much as experienced with Lincoln’s
enactment of an unconstitutional income tax, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of
1862, which established a comprehensive estate tax and collection methodology.127
The law created both an inheritance tax and a stamp tax on the transfer of estates at
graduated rates.128 Increased revenue needs by 1864 caused an increase in rates and
the addition of a legacy tax.129 As was the case with most of the Civil War taxes,
Congress repealed these taxes shortly after the war ended—the inheritance tax in 1870
and the stamp tax in 1872.130
Post-war, an attempt was made to challenge the constitutionality of the Civil War
era succession [sic estate] taxes in Scholey v. Rew.131 The Court ruled the “succession
tax” constitutional through a tortured interpretation of the Article I taxing power:
[B]ut it is clear that the tax or duty levied by the act under con-
sideration is not a direct tax within the meaning of either of those
provisions. Instead of that it is plainly an excise tax or duty,
authorized by section eight of article one, which vests the power
in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises
to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare. Such a tax or duty is neither a tax on land nor a capita-
tion exaction, as subsequently appears from the language of the
section imposing the tax or duty . . . .132
Here, the Court reacted to the preamble language of the Article I, Section 8,
taxing power, i.e., the tax “provide[d] for the common defence”133—effectively a war
tax—rather than on the specific issue of enumerated power.134 The Court made no
BULL. 118, 119 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc
/LBH3-T8W6].
126 See discussion supra Section I.B.
127 Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (amended 1864). See also David J. Herzig,
Justice For All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue Service, 33 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17–18 (dis-
cussing the inception of the Revenue Act of 1862).
128 See Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 175,
198 (2012) (noting that graduated rates were imposed depending on the degree of familial
relationship between the decedent and the recipient of the property).
129 Id. at 198–99 (discussing the inception of the Revenue Act of 1864 through which
Congress increased the inheritance tax rates and included real property transfers within the
parameters of the inheritance tax).
130 See id.; Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 119.
131 90 U.S. 331 (1874).
132 Id. at 346.
133 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
134 See Scholey, 90 U.S. at 346.
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effort to detail the definition of an excise tax of which the Estate Tax lacks fit. Perhaps
this was a political decision to protect revenue during the Civil War, and with the Act
repealed, the Court did not wish to open the door to further constitutional scrutiny.135
The Scholey Court, in giving the apparent “green light” to impose an Estate Tax
as a constitutional excise to support war [sic the common defense], allowed the Estate
Tax to raise its head once again in the guise of a war tax by way of the War Revenue
Act of 1898.136 The Act, bitterly debated, placed an Estate Tax on personal property.137
Its unpopularity resulted in Congress scaling back the law with major exemptions
in the War Revenue Reduction Act of 1901.138 With the end of the Spanish-American
War in 1902, the Estate Tax was repealed by the War Revenue Repeal Act of 1902.139
World War I once again raised the specter of the Estate Tax as a means of war
funding.140 Adding to the political environment of the times was growing public ire
against the concentration of economic power and wealth of the Robber Baron class,141
highlighted by the parsimony and notoriety of Rockefeller, then the richest man in
America.142 The mix of these circumstances led Congress to enact by statute what
became the beginning of the modern Federal Estate Tax, the Revenue Act of 1916.143
The new Estate Tax, for the first time, allowed the federal government to tax the
estate (property) directly instead of heirs.144 The tax, targeted at the wealthy, had a
$50,000 exemption for residents and for non-residents imposed a one percent tax on
the first $50,000 of estate value and ten percent tax on $5 million or more.145
135 See id. at 348 n.9.
136 Ch. 448, § 29, 30 Stat. 448, 464–65 (1898).
137 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 120 (noting the tax provided a $10,000 exemption
to exclude small estates from the tax and also exempted bequests made to a surviving spouse).
138 Ch. 806, 31 Stat. 938 (1901).
139 Ch. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96 (1902).
140 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 120.
141 See id.
142 Chase Peterson-Withorn, From Rockefeller to Ford, See Forbes’ 1918 Ranking of the
Richest People in America, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/chasewithorn/2017/09/19/the-first-forbes-list-see-who-the-richest-americans-were-in-1918
/#25ca8b364c0d [https://perma.cc/P4CD-DJ2U] (evaluating Rockefeller’s net worth in 1918
at $1.2 billion, which in 2017 was the equivalent of $21 billion).
143 Ch. 463, tit. 2, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916).
144 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 120.
145 Id. To demonstrate the targeted wealth intent of the Estate Tax, $1.00 in 1916 equals
$22.96 in 2016. These figures adjusted to 2016 dollars would have resulted in the following
equivalent values: $1.148 million exemption, one percent tax on $1.148 million, and ten per-
cent tax on estates over $114.8 million. See Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES, https://www
.dollartimes.com/inflation [https://perma.cc/E34J-N4QJ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). Further,
contrast these figures with the fact that the average American in 1915 had an annual income of
$687 (equating to $15,774.00 in 2016 dollars). See Carol Boyd Leon, The Life of American
Workers in 1915, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016
/article/pdf/the-life-of-american-workers-in-1915.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7UL-CNKM].
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Estate Taxes by and large impacted only the wealthy who had the means to take
advantage of legal loopholes, asset transfers, and estate planning tactics.146 Business
lobbyists were paid, advocating to Congressmen additional exemptions, exclusions,
and other devices to ensure Estate Taxes would stay at acceptably low levels.147
Nevertheless, without a detailed judicial review challenging its constitutionality, the
Estate Tax continued unfettered. World War I ended on November 11, 1918,148 but
unlike the situation in prior wars, Congress did not repeal the Estate Tax. Instead,
it became a political football among partisan parties in Congress and for presidential
candidates for the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.149
II. THE MODERN ESTATE TAX
Throughout the 2016 presidential election debates, Republican candidate Donald
Trump made the repeal of the death tax a key precept of his overall tax reform pro-
posal.150 A repeal of the Federal Estate Tax would be a victory for the small percentage
of wealthy families falling within the tax’s target threshold, incentivizing dynastic
levels of wealth within the United States.151 However, Trump’s campaign proposal
to eliminate the Estate Tax was not the first attempt in modern history to target the
repeal of the tax.152 In fact, the evolution of the Estate Tax in the modern legislative
era has been a key political edifice in the nation’s democratic system.
146 See supra notes 105, 144–45 and accompanying text. The average American worker
in 1915 making $687 a year would fall within the Estate Tax’s $50,000 exception. Those
wealthy enough to have assets over the exception were perceptive enough to shield them-
selves from the Estate Tax such as through a trust.
147 See Stephen Martin, America’s Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estate-tax
/470403/ [https://perma.cc/E69J-JUFS].
148 John Graham Royde-Smith & Dennis E. Showalter, World War 1, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I [https://perma
.cc/7P6U-LWDE].
149 See, e.g., Jeremy Scott, So Much For the Estate Tax Compromise, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2016,
9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2016/09/13/so-much-for-the-estate-tax-com
promise [https://perma.cc/59HM-5R6U] (discussing the 2016 presidential candidates—Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton—and their ideas about the Estate Tax and American Taxpayer
Relief Act (ATRA)).
150 Ashlea Ebeling, Will Trump Victory Yield Estate Tax Repeal?, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016,
11:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/11/09/will-trump-victory-yield
-estate-tax-repeal/ [https://perma.cc/2LFX-WEEW].
151 See id. Numerically, in tax year 2015 only 4,918 estates fell subject to the tax, with
collected revenue of about $17 billion, accounting for less than one percent of all federal
revenue. Id.
152 See Chris Edwards, Tax Policy Under President Bush, CATO INSTITUTE, https://www
.cato.org/publications/commentary/tax-policy-under-president-bush [https://perma.cc/LM7U
-E8KJ] (discussing President George W. Bush’s promise to repeal the Estate Tax) (last
visited Oct. 15, 2018).
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The establishment of the modern Estate Tax in 1916 created a tax on the transfer
of wealth from an estate to its beneficiaries (rather than a tax levied directly on
beneficiaries).153 Following its enactment, the first major modification to the Estate
Tax was the addition of a gift tax on inter vivos transfers under the Revenue Act of
1932.154 Congress ordained such an adaptation to deter wealthy individuals from
avoiding the Estate Tax by transferring wealth during their lifetimes.155 Three years
later, the Revenue Act of 1935 provided for an “optional valuation date election,” which
allowed an estate to be valued one year after a decedent’s death for tax purposes.156
Just over a decade later, a significant adjustment to the Estate Tax came with the
Revenue Act of 1948.157 This Act established the estate and gift tax marital deduction,
which allowed a decedent’s adjusted gross estate to deduct one-half of the value of
property passing to a surviving spouse.158 A similar deduction was allowed for inter
vivos gifts made to a spouse.159 Following this legislative enactment, Congress fell
relatively silent with respect to the Estate Tax for over thirty years until the enactment
of the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1976.160
The TRA created an estate and gift tax framework consisting of unified graduated
tax rates imposed on inter vivos gifts and testamentary dispositions.161 Before the en-
actment of the TRA, Estate Tax rates varied from an initial rate of one to three percent
(depending upon the tax year) on the first $50,000 of an estate to upwards of seventy-
seven percent on the portion of an estate falling within the highest bracket.162 
In contrast, again prior to the TRA, gift tax allowances not only afforded similar
exemption amounts to those of the Estate Tax, but also provided for annual gift tax
exclusion amounts ranging from $3,000 to $5,000 depending upon the year, and maxi-
mized at a rate of fifty-eight percent (as compared to the highest Estate Tax rate of
seventy-seven percent).163 Such vast differentials between estate and gift tax rates
153 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit. 2, § 201, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916). See also Jacobson
et al., supra note 125, at 120.
154 Ch. 209, tit. 3, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245 (1932). See also Jacobson et al., supra note 125,
at 121–22 (explaining that this addition of a gift tax became a permanent feature in 1932).
155 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 122.
156 Revenue Act of 1916 Sec. 202, Pub. L. No. 407. Although the idea of the optional
valuation date election still exists today, it is now referred to as the alternate valuation date
and the timing has been reduced to six months following a decedent’s date of death. See also
26 U.S.C. § 2032 (2017).
157 Ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
158 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 122.
159 Id.
160 Pub. L. No. 94-455, Stat. 1520 (2017).
161 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 122.
162 See id. at 122 Fig. D: Estate Tax Exemptions and Tax Rates.
163 See Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 1916–2014, TAX
FOUNDATION (Feb. 4, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemp
tions-and-exclusions-1916-2014/ [https://perma.cc/3TVG-XHW5].
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amounted to a growing concern that wealthy families were being incentivized to give
property away during life rather than dispose of it at death in order to save tax dollars.164
The merging of the estate and gift tax exclusions into a “single, unified estate
and gift tax credit” effectively eliminated the ability of individuals to gift property
at lower tax rates during their lifetimes.165 The TRA retained a $3,000 annual gift
exclusion per donee, included an annual increase in the Estate Tax filing exemption,
and introduced a tax on generation-skipping transfer trusts (GSTs).166
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) brought additional changes
to the Estate Tax.167 Included in this legislative evolution was the allowance of marital
deductions on non-terminable estates of qualified terminable interest property (QTIP),
unlimited estate and gift tax marital deductions, a phased increase in the unified
transfer tax credit and annual gift tax exclusion, and a phased reduction in the highest
estate, gift, and GST tax rates.168 Congress later passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997,169 which, among other things, promulgated the incremental increase of the
unified tax credit, “effectively raising the Estate Tax filing threshold to $1 million.”170
President George W. Bush made the repeal of the Estate Tax a critical component
of his first term in office in a staunch effort to save small businesses and farms.171
In fact, for years leading up to 2001, numerous commentators and politicians called
for a repeal of the Estate Tax.172 During Bush’s first year as president, Congress
passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA).173 This provided extensive changes to the transfer tax system, including
gradually phasing out Estate Tax rates while increasing exemption amounts until
2010. In 2010, the Estate Tax was set to be abolished for a single year, followed by
a return to the original 2001 rates in 2011.174 The scheduled repeal of the tax for just
164 See Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 122.
165 Id. (citing HOWARD ZARITSKY & THOMAS RIPY, FEDERAL ESTATE, GIFT, AND GENERA-
TION SKIPPING TAXES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT LAW 18
(1984)).
166 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 122–23 (noting the Estate Tax filing exemption
increased from $60,000 to $120,000 for 1977 decedents).
167 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 123.
168 See Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 123.
169 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
170 Jacobson et al., supra note 125, at 123 (noting that other changes enacted in 1997
included adding a family business deduction for estates in which businesses made up at least
fifty percent of the gross estate).
171 Matthew B. Gaudin, Note, The Federal Estate Tax and the National Debt: Why the
Debt Forces a Defense of the Tax, 45 IND. L. REV. 159, 159 (2011).
172 Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts
in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 257, 267 (2015) (citing Joel C. Dobris,
A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1985)).
173 Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
174 See Gaudin, supra note 171, at 160; see also Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act of 2001, 115 Stat. 38.
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one year resulted in a plethora of news commentary about beneficiaries incentivizing
heirs to live to 2010, but not beyond.175 This included an article in The New York
Times by Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman who penned EGTRRA as
the “Throw Momma From the Train Act of 2001.”176
Due to federal budgetary constraints, estates of persons dying in 2011 and beyond
were set on a trajectory reversion back to the 2001 Estate Tax exemption amount of
$1 million under EGTRRA.177 In late December 2010, Congress, with Democratic
President Barack Obama in the White House, enacted the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (2010 Tax Relief Act).178
This finessed the Estate Tax by providing for a two year rate of thirty-five percent
with an exclusion amount of $5 million.179 Two years later, in the final hour of
January 1, 2013, Congress passed the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Act),180
which averted the fiscal cliff imposed by the 2010 Tax Relief Act (the Estate Tax
exemption was scheduled to return to $1 million) by permanently setting the federal
estate, gift, and GST transfers at $5 million, indexed for inflation.181
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law the TCJA, which
temporarily doubles the estate and gift tax exclusion amount.182 Specifically, the law
sets a new $10 million base exemption amount for estate, gift, and generation-
skipping taxes.183 The exemption, however, is indexed for inflation, which will allow
an individual to shelter $11.2 million in assets from the Estate Tax.184 With regard
175 See Joseph Brownstein, Lack of Estate Tax in 2010: Now Cheaper to Die?, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 1, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/HealthCare/lack-estate-tax-2010-now-cheaper
-die/story?id=9412614 [https://perma.cc/W2GB-6DGW].
176 Paul Krugman, Reckonings; Bad Heir Day, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2001), https://nyti
.ms/2MhPAYE. One of the more prominent examples of this period entailed the owner of
the New York Yankees and Yankee Stadium, George Steinbrenner, who died at age eighty
in July 2010 leaving an estate estimated to be worth $1.6 billion. His heirs benefitted from
Steinbrenner dying in 2010 because his estate saved nearly $600 million in federal estate taxes.
See How Steinbrenner Saved His Heirs a $600 Million Tax Bill, WALL ST. J.:METROPOLIS
BLOG (July 13, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/07/13/how-steinbrenner
-saved-his-heirs-a-600-million-tax-bill/.
177 See Michael S. Kutzin, The Estate Tax is Back, but With Some Twists—and Opportuni-
ties, GOLDFARB ABRANDT SALZMAN & KUTZIN LLP, http://www.seniorlaw.com/the-estate
-tax-is-back-but-with-some-twists-and-opportunities-2/ [https://perma.cc/3BF9-R7XV] (last
visited Oct. 15, 2018).
178 Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
179 See Soled & Gans, supra note 172, at 269.
180 Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
181 See Soled & Gans, supra note 172, at 270.
182 Harris Beach PLLC, Federal Estate, Gift and GST Tax Exemption Amounts Spike,
JDSUPRA (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-estate-gift-and-gst
-tax-34058/ [https://perma.cc/8FM8-MB8H].
183 See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
184 Ashlea Ebeling, Final Tax Bill Includes Huge Estate Tax Win For the Rich: the $22.4
Million Exemption, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashlea
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to the Federal Estate Tax, the TCJA provides enormous planning opportunities for the
wealthy while remaining virtually inapplicable to most Americans.185 At least through
the sunset period established in the Act, it appears the Estate Tax is here to stay.
Since 2013, the modern Estate Tax makes up only about 0.7 percent of the total
annual federal revenue source, in large part because few individuals have estates large
enough to exceed the exemption amount.186 Although the debate over whether to
continue the imposition of an Estate Tax covers a vast political continuum, arguments
for and against the tax generally lean on the premise of competing values.187 Amidst
the turbulent evolution of the modern Estate Tax, the underlying question of whether
the tax is even constitutional has seemingly failed to take shape.
Perhaps the striking absence of argument within the political spectrum as to
whether the Estate Tax is constitutional is due in large part to the Supreme Court’s
upholding of the tax as constitutional in two very early twentieth century cases.188
To appreciate the argument that the Estate Tax, in its inherent unfairness, is a literal
taking of private property rights, we next briefly analyze the judicial historical pro-
tection of the Estate Tax.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ESTATE TAX
Nowhere within the spectrum of the United States Constitution is the power to
tax the estates of deceased persons explicitly granted.189 Article I of the Constitution
defines the role of Congress, while Section 8 dictates the enumerated powers of the
federal government as delegated to Congress.190 However, the Estate Tax has his-
torically solidified its constitutional roots within the general stricture of the Constitution
which states, “[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and




186 Jane McGrath, The History of the ‘Death Tax,’ HOWSTUFFWORKS (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://money.howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/personal-income-taxes/history-of-death
-tax4.htm [https://perma.cc/SD4K-VUWC]. According to the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, in 2016 the exemption amount was $5.45 million and the top statutory rate was
40%. The Federal Estate Tax, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 14, 2017), http://
www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-the-estate-tax [https://perma.cc/2QR9-ZFG5].
187 See Carter, supra note 128, at 189 (noting that opponents of the modern Estate Tax
advocate for the elimination of the tax in order to retain hard-earned income, while proponents
advocate its use to curtain inherited wealth).
188 See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41 (1900).
189 Lowndes, supra note 9, at 142.
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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The imposition of the Estate Tax has perpetually stood as a controversial area
of political debate.192 As noted previously, prior to World War I the country was in
need of revenue,193 and academics have opined that the Estate Tax historically pro-
vided a legitimate means of generating necessary (war) income.194 Others have argued
that the purpose of the Tax was to minimize “wealth being amassed by powerful
families in an effort to avoid budding aristocracy in the United States.”195
Since its creation, the Supreme Court has contributed significant jurisprudence
to the interpretation of constitutional tax clauses, with the majority of cases argued
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.196 However, only a very limited
number of the highest Court’s cases have dealt specifically with the constitutional
issues of the Estate Tax.197
The general postulate requires that a federal tax on the ownership of property would,
as a direct tax, present genuine constitutional obstacles.198 The Supreme Court has
avoided this impasse by characterizing a tax imposed on the happening of an event, such
as transfer of title upon death, as an indirect tax.199 In its 1921 case New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner,200 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Federal Estate Tax, holding
that an estate tax is an indirect rather than direct tax on a decedent’s property.201
Relying on one of its previous opinions, Knowlton v. Moore,202 Justice Holmes
delivered the majority opinion in denying recovery of the Estate Tax levied by
Congress.203 Despite the fact that the Knowlton Court dealt with a legacy (inheritance)
tax while the Eisner Court analyzed the Estate Tax, Holmes found the distinction
immaterial.204 In the final lines of his opinion, Justice Holmes noted that the Estate
Tax was not one that was imposed directly on intestate successors, but rather it
preceded them, and the fact that beneficiaries of an estate may have received less or
192 See Susan K. Hill, Comment, Leaping Before We Look?: Repeal of the State Estate Tax
Credit and the Consequences for States, Americans, and the Federal Government, 32 PEPP.
L. REV. 151, 158 (2004).
193 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
194 Id. at 157 (citing Krisanne M. Schlachter, Note, Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift
Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV.
781, 782 n.7 (2000)).
195 Id. at 157–58.
196 Evgeny Magidenko, Classifying Federal Taxes For Constitutional Purposes, 45 U.
BALT. L. REV. 57, 63–64 (2015).
197 Id. at 90, 98 (explaining the holdings of New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345
(1921) and Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945) respectively).
198 Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax, 15 AKRON TAX J.
35, 42 (2000).
199 Id.
200 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
201 See id. at 349–50.
202 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
203 Eisner, 256 U.S. at 349.
204 Id. at 348–49; Magidenko, supra note 196, at 90.
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different amounts upon the distribution of an estate because of statute was of no
concern to the United States.205
The Knowlton case, issued sixteen years before the inception of the modern Estate
Tax, was premised on the War Revenue Act of 1898.206 The case specifically con-
sidered the validity of a succession tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal
property.207 Nevertheless, the Knowlton Court took a superficial view of the death
tax’s constitutionality:
Death duties were established by the Roman and ancient law, and
by the modern laws of France, Germany and other continental
countries, England and her colonies, and an examination of all
shows that tax laws of this nature rest in their essence upon the
principle that death is the generating source from which the par-
ticular taxing power takes its being, and that it is the power to
transmit or the transmission from the dead to the living on which
such taxes are more immediately vested . . . . The provision in sec-
tion 8 of article I of the Constitution that “all duties, imports [sic]
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” refers
purely to a geographical uniformity, and is synonymous with the
expression “to operate generally throughout the United States.”208
There appear to be significant historical errors in the legal reasoning backing this
opinion. The history of the American Revolution and the Framers’ constitutional
construction was intent to precisely distance the new nation from European and
Roman law that had hamstrung government and liberty of citizens, the abuses of
which led to the Revolution itself.209
Rome’s Estate Tax history provides a particularly dark example. During the
Triumvirate of Tiberius Gracchus (The Gracchi) in 133 B.C., an estate tax was imposed
to limit the size of estates and recapture wealth from landowners.210 The oppressive
tax proved to be unpopular and offensive to the Roman ruling classes.211 History records
what followed when Gracchus ran for reelection to the Roman Senate and Triumvirate:
205 Eisner, 256 U.S. at 349.
206 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 43. See also War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448
(1898).
207 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 43–44. The 1898 Act was technically distinguishable as a legacy
tax versus the more modern Estate Tax.
208 Id. at 42.
209 See supra notes 27–53 and accompanying text.
210 VALERIO LINTNER, A TRAVELER’S HISTORY OF ITALY 34 (7TH ed. 2004) (“[Gracchus]
proposed to enforce the legal limit on the size of estates, which had up to now been conven-
iently ignored, to repossess the surplus and redistribute it to the poor.”).
211 Id.
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“A mob led by Scipio Nasica disrupted the senate and started a riot in which Tiberius
Gracchus and 300 of his followers were clubbed to death.”212 His successor Gaius
Gracchus in 121 B.C. was also assassinated, along with 3,000 of his followers.213
These events led to the end of the Roman Estate Tax experiment of that era.214
Nearly 100 years later under the rule of Augustus Caesar (Octavian), the Roman
system was changed to use estate law to encourage inheritance to those who married
and increased the birth rate of a then declining Roman population: “The Lex Julia, which
was aimed at increasing the birth-rate, deprived unmarried or childless men of the
right to inherit [estates], and other Measures provided tax incentives for large families.”215
Consequently, the Knowlton Court’s analogy of Rome and Europe erred by ignor-
ing a history of confiscatory income and wealth taxes, abuses of due process, and
capital punishments. As a result, the specific limitations of the federal taxing power
were intended by the Constitutional Framers to avoid the Euro-Roman historical
liberty infringing history.216 To accept the Knowlton Court’s logic is to dismiss the
need for the enumerated taxing power in the Constitution itself. The Framers were
clear in their determination that Congress’s power was to be strictly limited to con-
sumption (purchase) taxes [hence the concept of volunteerism], which they limited
to excise and imposts other than income later granted by the Sixteenth Amendment.217
The Knowlton court laid a dangerous precedent: any time Congress declares a
new innovative tax as an “excise” tax—no matter how remote to an established defi-
nition of an excise tax—the Court will accept that characterization for expediency
of the federal government or popular politic of the moment.218 Leading the majority,
Justice Holmes did not wish to go down the road of previous Courts and hold to the
plain reading of enumerated powers specified in the Constitution. The Justices’ views
on the Constitution were more pragmatist and evolutionary, rather than devoted to
the Constitutional Framer’s bedrock reading.219
212 Id.
213 Id. at 35.
214 Id. (“Thus ended the sincere, but on reflection rather naive, attempt by the Gracchi
brothers to reform the republic.”).
215 Id. at 42.
216 See supra notes 27–53 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
218 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 84–85 (1800) (“The two contentions then may
be summarized by saying that the one asserts [unequal individual treatment] . . . and the other
that [Congress is restrained on excise taxes only that it must be geographic in form].”).
219 See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). Justice Holmes, once again
delivering the majority opinion, expounded on his reading of the Constitution:
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas
having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions
transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal;
it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but
by considering their origin and the line of their growth.
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Justice Holmes, akin to other Justices past and present, was cognizant of the Court
not straying too far from the tenor of the citizenry. Decisions of law based on political
rather than firm constitutional bases often have adverse consequences to the nation.220
In the face of the plain text of Article I of the Constitution, Supreme Court Justices
of the early twentieth century lived in a society of intense public sentiment against
the Robber Barons,221 leading to more “progressive” Republican presidents including
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.222 Under Democratic President
Woodrow Wilson, however, Congress and Progressives took aim at wealthy individ-
uals,223 and the Supreme Court found nothing to gain by opposing them, even if that
meant a clear misreading of constitutional intent and limited authority. Without
sufficient and detailed analysis, the 1921 Court presumed the constitutionality of the
Estate Tax would remain.224
Six years after the Eisner decision, the Court once again took up a case chal-
lenging the Federal Estate Tax in Florida v. Mellon.225 Florida, by parens patriae,
challenged the constitutionality of the tax—not based on it being beyond the enumerated
powers of Congress—but rather, that since its state constitution forbade an Estate
Tax, its residents could not receive a credit against the Federal Estate Tax for state
taxes paid.226 Florida argued:
[T]hat [it] is directly interested in preventing the unlawful discrimi-
nation against its citizens which is effected by § 301 and in pro-
tecting them against the risk of prosecution for failure to comply
with the enforcement provisions of the act; that the several states,
except Florida, Alabama, and Nevada, levy inheritance taxes, but
by reason of the provisions of its constitution Florida cannot place
its citizens on an equality with those of the other states in respect
of the tax in question, and [therefore] the tax is not uniform
throughout the United States as required by § 8 of Article I of the
federal Constitution.227
220 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This case is a glaring example
of the Supreme Court’s turning a blind eye to the Constitution, allowing the internment of
United States citizens of Japanese descent during WWII (without like treatment of German
or Italian Americans).
221 See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
222 Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/Theodore-Roosevelet-and-the-Progressive
-movement [https://perma.cc/42E8-7SUM] (last updated Sept. 2, 2018) (noting Taft thought
of himself as a progressive).
223 See id. (explaining Wilson’s strong push toward antitrust reform).
224 See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1921).
225 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
226 See id. at 15–16.
227 Id. at 16.
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Similar to its analysis in Eisner, the Court refused to entertain any discussion of
the constitutionality of the Estate Tax, claiming it was settled law under prior rulings.228
The Court further dismissed constitutional claims for lack of uniformity:
The contention that the federal tax is not uniform because other
states impose inheritance taxes while Florida does not, is without
merit. Congress cannot accommodate its legislation to the con-
flicting or dissimilar laws of the several states nor control the
diverse conditions to be found in the various states which necessar-
ily work unlike results from the enforcement of the same tax. All
that the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 1) requires is that the law shall
be uniform in the sense that by its provisions the rule of liability
shall be the same in all parts of the United States.229
Again, as in Eisner, the Court deferred to political expediency in supporting the
Estate Tax and refused to engage in a detailed analysis of the tax’s legitimacy under
the Constitution.230 Without further analysis, the Court stated that the Estate Tax was
an “excise.”231 Neither the Eisner nor Florida Courts heeded the famous sentiment
of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison when he noted, “[i]f . . . courts are
to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
they both apply.”232
Major challenges to the Estate Tax remained essentially quiet thereafter. Perhaps
the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the resulting financial impact of the Great
Depression made moot a majority of those who would have been impacted. Only a
small number of extremely wealthy persons remained relatively unscathed. The advent
of World War II again put tax policy into focus under war powers and the need to
finance victory. It was not until 1960—forty-four years after the first enactment of
the modern Estate Tax—when another challenge to the Estate Tax fell in to the hands
of the Supreme Court.233
In United States v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Detroit,234 such a challenge
emerged from a technicality in the application of the Estate Tax by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).235 The decedent at issue had purchased insurance policies which during
his lifetime he had assigned ownership to his wife, though he continued to pay the
228 See id. at 17.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See id. Here the Court took the famous position articulated in Marbury v. Madison that
“[i]t is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
232 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
233 See United States v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
234 Id.
235 See id. at 196–97.
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premiums.236 Upon his death, his wife received the proceeds of the policies.237 The
IRS took the position that only the amounts paid in insurance premiums should be
included in the estate.238 Consequently, “[t]he executor claimed that because the
decedent had divested himself of all interest in the policies in 1936, the tax constituted
an unapportioned direct tax on property, invalid under Article I, Sections 2 and 9,
of the Constitution.”239
Again the Court refused to delve into a detailed analysis of the constitutionality
of the Estate Tax itself. With a brush of the judicial hand in a very brief opinion, the
Court held steadfast to Knowlton and Eisner stating, “the tax is clearly constitutional
without apportionment. For such a tax has always ‘been treated as a duty or excise,
because of the particular occasion which gives rise to its levy.’”240 The Court
dismissed all other arguments and held the insurance was part of the estate.241
IV. THE TIME IS RIPE—REVISITING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ESTATE TAX
2016 represented the centennial of the birth of the modern Federal Estate Tax.242
Through its decisions in Knowlton and Eisner, the Supreme Court, without any
detailed analysis, declared the Estate Tax to be an excise tax—thus treating it as
constitutional—without further elaboration.243 However, such ardent declaration with-
out reasonable backing begs the question of whether the Estate Tax is, in fact,
constitutional. Any re-examination of this issue by the high Court would open up
the possibility of overturning Knowlton.
Throughout history the Court has reversed prior precedents that were later found
to be unconstitutionally decided.244 It is not accepted practice that merely because a law
remains on the books for a long period without challenge, that it assumes constitu-
tional legitimacy.245 Indeed, the history of the Republic saw courts actively hold
Congress to the prescriptions of its Article I power to limit taxes to true “excises and
imposts.”246 This forced Congress, as the Framers established, to seek a constitutional
236 Id. at 196.
237 See id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 196–97.
240 Id. at 198 (citing to Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81 (1900) and New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
241 See id. at 199.
242 The modern Federal Estate Tax was enacted in 1916. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
tit. 2, 39 Stat. 756, 777.
243 See supra Part III.
244 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
245 For example, in Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), the Supreme
Court ruled USDA’s confiscation of farmers’ raisins under the guise of Depression era agri-
cultural acts to be a blatant violation of the Fifth Amendment, even though the law and practice
had existed for over seventy years.
246 See Alica Lerud, Note, Looking to the Past in Planning for the Future: Does the Mod-
ern Estate Tax Fit within the Ideals of the Founding Fathers?, 6 NEV. L.J. 516, 516 (2005)
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amendment to add any tax system beyond it, that being the Sixteenth Amendment
allowing for income taxes.247 Here the Estate Tax was expressly considered,248 yet
excluded in the final drafting of the Amendment.249
Congress, post–Civil War, was so concerned with Court interference by injunc-
tion on its policies to enact and collect taxes that in 1867 it passed the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act,250 prohibiting federal judges from enjoining a federal tax pending final
judicial ruling of legal challenge.251 Because the Estate Tax had such a relatively small
constituency, it was easy for the judiciary to simply call it “legal,” thus avoiding the
judiciary being charged with being in the pocket of the rich. What changed, of course,
was rapid inflation post–World War II bringing unintended middle class citizens into
the clutches of the Estate Tax.
Today’s post–World War II Baby Boom generation has entered its retirement
age strata, many of whom have saved, invested in both real and personal properties—
particularly small businesses, houses, and farms—and as a result, are now at risk of
Estate Tax levies.252 In the 2000s, Congress established a much higher Estate Tax
exemption indexed to inflation.253 The 2017 signing of the TCJA temporarily doubles
the estate and gift tax exclusion amount.254 Such high thresholds suggest that the
Estate Tax has become effectively a moot issue for the majority of citizens, and thus
the prospect of further constitutional challenges to the Supreme Court appear remote.
Nevertheless, the reality is the Estate Tax is more social-political theater than
a sound revenue source for the federal government. In 2013, the Urban-Brookings
Tax Policy Center estimated the average estate paying Estate Tax that year was $22.7
million at an effective tax rate of 16.6 percent.255 According to figures from the Office
of Management and Budget, for Tax Year 2014 the United States government raised
total tax revenue of $3 trillion, of which $19.3 billion, or 0.6 percent, was derived
from the Estate Tax.256 This percentage represented the lowest yield of any federal
(summarizing the conception of the Art. 8, Sec. 1 language and how it influenced key pre–
Sixteenth Amendment holdings).
247 See id. at 533–35.
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tax revenue received.257 Revenue derived from the Estate Tax continues to decline
each year as the estate exemption is indexed to the cost of living.258 Put another way,
all of the proceeds of the Estate Tax for one year could barely pay for the United
States Navy’s three newest stealth ships.259 The IRS reported Estate Tax revenue for
2015 of $17.1 billion,260 one of the smallest revenue streams in the federal budget.261
Eliminating the Estate Tax by federal statute would ultimately not resolve the
overriding question of whether the tax itself is constitutional. As the Federal Estate
Tax marks its century of existence, and as the TCJA now exponentially increases the
exemption amounts through to the end of 2025,262 it is unlikely that a judicial chal-
lenge is on the horizon. Rather, the growing trend of legislative actions at the state
level to abolish estate taxes, along with its unpopularity in a majority Republican
Congress, may make the issue moot in the future. Nevertheless, the detailed analysis
and historical context of our national tax policy strongly suggests a fair reading of
the Constitution would conclude the Federal Estate Tax is, in fact, unconstitutional
as a taxing power not granted by the specific limitations of Article I or the Sixteenth
Amendment.263 Presently the tax has survived another round of scrutiny with its in-
clusion in the TCJA.264 It lives yet another day.
CONCLUSION
The United States of America was born from a revolution against European
sovereign-imposed taxation. That issue remained front and center in the Continental
Congress, first through the Articles of Confederation which essentially removed the
power of the federal government to tax, raising its revenue by state contribution.265
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The structure of the Articles proving unworkable, the Framers of the Constitution
were meticulous in enumerating specific limits upon the power of the central govern-
ment to tax its citizens.266
Those limitations were upheld for the most part throughout the later Eighteenth
and Nineteenth centuries by a judiciary that adhered to the plain reading of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 (“Taxing Power”), and effectively directed that if Congress desired
to go beyond enumerated powers, the established method was by constitutional amend-
ment.267 However, beginning in the Twentieth Century, successive Supreme Court
benches diverged from past traditional constitutional jurisprudence, advancing the
theory that if Congress—as representative of “the People”—passed new taxes, then
it would be up to voters to require that Congress reject or repeal them.
Populism impinged on constitutional analysis. The need to raise revenue in the
immediacy of difficult times, particularly during war and massive social movements,
became more compelling to judicial reasoning than a “constitutionalist” approach
furthering the recognition of the Framers’ constitutional intent. Such was the situation
in which the modern Federal Estate Tax emerged in 1916.
Notwithstanding historical challenges that the Estate Tax was neither an excise
nor impost as prescribed in our nation’s Constitution, the Supreme Court adhered
to its determination that the Estate Tax is an “excise” in New York Trust Company
v. Eisner, without additional detailed analysis. Such dogma has since been maintained
through the decades, without further re-examination by the Court. However, it is clear
from a historical perspective that the 1921 Supreme Court failed to follow a “strict
constructionist” constitutional analysis in making its decision.
President Trump’s election campaign pledge to repeal the Estate Tax failed.
Instead, in 2017 he signed into law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,268 which temporarily
doubles the exemption amount for estate, gift, and generation-skipping taxes, making
the Tax itself inapplicable to the vast majority of Americans. However, the law’s
sunset provision means a reversion back to the original $5 million base, or a move-
ment by Congress or the Supreme Court to take action before the end of 2025.
With a Supreme Court bench consisting of a majority of adherents to a more
“strict constructionist” point of view, we conclude that the time may be ripe for the
current Supreme Court to re-examine and confront the constitutionality of the Federal
Estate Tax. Such review is well within the long historical foundations of the Republic
to assure government power is kept in check. The Estate Tax brings to mind the
famous admonition of Thomas Jefferson, quoted by President Gerald F. Ford, “[a]
government big enough to give you everything you want is a government big enough
to take from you everything you have.”269
266 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
267 U.S. CONST. art. V.
268 See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
269 President Gerald R. Ford, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Aug. 12, 1974), 1974
PUB. PAPERS 6 (1974).
